Victorian circa 1860 period page of photographs from a British Army officer’s album, all small form gelatine silver print studio photographs mounted onto both sides of an album page, 11 in all showing people, three further detailing a house and location. Old pencil written notes detail ranks and surnames of some of the officers, though one (first page lower row middle) whilst not identified by name in pencil has nevertheless been identified by the previous collector who had a interest in the Zulu War and South Africa. This is identified as being the future Lieutenant Colonel Anthony William Durnford, Royal Engineers, who during the Zulu War was the senior officer to be killed in action at the Battle of Isandhlwana on 22 January 1879.
Condition: clear images, some tarnishing from age to paper mount, generally Good Condition.
Lieutenant Colonel Anthony William Durnford, Royal Engineers, (24 May 1830 – 22 January 1879), was an Irish career British Army officer and one of the most experienced officers of the Anglo-Zulu War --"commanding presence, untiring energy and undoubted powers of leadership", he was also apt to be headstrong, and was threatened with loss of command by Lord Chelmsford. Assigned to lead the No. 2 Column of Chelmsford's invasion army, Durnford commanded a mixed force of African troops including the Natal Native Horse and a detachment of the 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent.
On 20 January, Durnford's force was ordered to Rorke’s Drift to support Chelmsford's column. That evening, a portion of the No. 2 Column under Durnford arrived at Rorke's Drift and camped on the Zulu bank, where it remained through the next day. Late on the evening of 21 January, Durnford was ordered to Isandhlwana, as was a small detachment of No. 5 Field Company, Royal Engineers, commanded by Lieutenant John Chard, which had arrived on the 19th to repair the pontoons which bridged the Buffalo River. Chard rode ahead of his detachment to Isandlwana on the morning of 22 January to clarify his orders, but was sent back to Rorke's Drift with only his wagon and its driver to construct defensive positions for the expected reinforcement company, passing Durnford's column en route in the opposite direction.
Around 10:30 am on the morning of 22 January, Durnford arrived from Rorke's Drift with five troops of the Natal Native horse and a rocket battery. Durnford was superior in rank to Brevet Lt.-Col. Henry Pulleine, who had been left in control of the camp, and by tradition would have assumed command. Durnford did not over-rule Pulleine's dispositions, however, and after lunch he quickly decided to take the initiative and move forward to engage a Zulu force which Pulleine and Durnford judged to be moving against Chelmsford's rear. Durnford asked for a company of the 24th, but Pulleine was reluctant to agree, since his orders had been specifically to defend the camp.
Durnford was killed during the resulting battle, and was later criticised for taking men out of the camp thus weakening its defence. His policy was, in effect, to ride to the sound of the guns, "and attack the Zulu wherever they appeared". He was well respected by his native Basutos. Moreover, the actions of Durnford and his command effectively halted the left horn of the Zulu army until their cartridge boxes began to run dry. This was no small accomplishment considering the Left Horn included the inGobamakhosi regiment, "The Benders of the Kings". Their ammunition supply expended, Durnford and his troopers fought their way back to the "saddle" that separated the wagon park from the rest of the camp. In one last valiant effort, Durnford, after ordering his native troopers to escape, perished with a mixed group of colonial volunteers, members of the Natal Mounted Police and infantrymen of the 24th Foot that had held open the only escape route. Durnford's body was later found lying near a wagon, surrounded by the bodies of his men.
Among the causes of the disaster were the ill-defined relationship between Durnford and Pulleine, brought about by failures of Lord Chelmsford’s command and control, a lack of good intelligence on the size and location of Zulu forces which resulted in Chelmsford splitting his force and, most decidedly, Chelmsford's decision not to fortify the camp (which was in direct violation of his own standing pre-campaign orders).
