The fine Second World War Bomber Command 5 Group Lancaster Bomber Pilot’s 1945 Distinguished Flying Cross group with flying log books, awarded to Flying Officer D.W. “Skip” Martin, D.F.C., Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, later British European Airways. From Liverpool and later nearby Birkenhead, he enlisted in September 1939, and began pilot training in mid-1942. As a Lancaster bomber pilot, he flew operationally with No.5 Group from late September 1944. In all he completed 33 operational sorties, the first 8 of which were with 619 Squadron out of Dunholme Lodge and then Strubby. Having switched to 189 Squadron, he then flew out of Fulbeck on his remaining 25 sorties, attacking heavily defended targets including Munich, Dresden, Gdynia and Hamburg. Martin flew in the first of the devastating Dresden raids on the night of 13 February 1945, but it was during a raid on Bohlan, therefore either 19 February or 20 March, that one of the engines of his aircraft failed when some 100 miles from the target. Despite the fact that he could not attain bombing height and had the greatest difficulty in keeping to times, he went on to the target and pressed home the attack with courage and resolution. His award of the Distinguished Flying Cross was gazetted in November 1945. He later joined British European Airways, and apparently flew in the Berlin Airlift.
Group of 5: Distinguished Flying Cross, GVI GRI 1st type cypher, revere dated: ‘1945’; 1939-1945 Star; France and Germany Star; Defence Medal; War Medal. Mounted swing style as worn. Together with the Royal Mint fitted presentation case for the first, this complete with original mounting pin, single D.F.C. ribbon enclosed, and also a newspaper cutting detailing the award.
Condition: Good Very Fine.
Together with the following:
Buckingham Palace forwarding letter for the award of the Distinguished Flying Cross, this bearing typed details for: ‘Flying Officer Desmond W. Martin, D.F.C.’
Royal Air Force Pilot’s Flying Log Book, cover inscribed: ‘965939 Martin D.W.’, covering the period from 16 November 1942 through to 26 July 1945.
Royal Air Force Pilot’s Flying Log Book, cover inscribed: ‘F/O Martin D.W.’ and inside opening page similarly inscribed, covering the period from 10 August 1945 through to 13 May 1948.
Pair of Great War medals given to the recipient’s father: British War Medal 1914-1919; (FRANCIS MARTIN); Mercantile Marine War Medal 1914-1919; (FRANCIS MARTIN), mounted swing style for display.
Royal Air Force officer’s stable belt.
Peaked Cap for the Captain of an aircraft flying for British European Airways. Circa 1960’s.
British European Airways Pilot’s jacket, this bearing BEA pilot wings, and also the recipient’s medal ribbon bar. Plus matching trousers.
A leather pouch containing tunic buttons for the British European Airways.
Desmond William Martin, known as “Skip” to his fellow aircraft members, was born in 1919 in Liverpool, where he was educated at St. Margaret’s Central School, and then lived in Birkenhead. Owing to the Second World War he enlisted into the Royal Air Force in September 1939. Initially he was employed as ground crew, but in July 1942 went forward for flying training, and on 20 July was posted to No.4 Elementary Flying Training School at Brough where he remained until 4 August 1942 when he flew his first solo in a D.H.82.
Martin was then posted for further training over in the United States when he joined No.5 Basic Flying Training School at Riddle Field, Clewiston, Florida on 16 November 1942. Flying in the P.T.17, before moving on to the A.T.6.A, he completed the course on 25 May 1943, and despite passing, was rated as a ‘below average’ pilot, and a ‘slow thinker’. Martin was now a Sergeant (No.965939), and was posted home to No.3 (Pilot’s) Advanced Flying Unit at Bibury, where he flew the twin-engined Oxford from 5 December, and later that month, moved with the unit to Southrop. In early February 1944 he was posted to No.1540 Beam Approach Training Flight at Lulsgate Bottom, and of 22 February was assessed as ‘average’. He then returned to No.3 (Pilot’s) Advanced Flying Unit at Southrop, and remained there flying the Oxford until he was posted to No.29 Operational Training Unit at Bruntingthorpe on 4 April 1944, where he teamed up with his crew and gained experience in the Wellington bomber as a part of ‘B’ Flight. As of 19 June 1944 he was rated as an ‘average’ medium bomber pilot.
On 12 July 1944 he and his crew found themselves posted to No.1660 Heavy Bomber Conversion Unit at Swinderby, where he flew the Stirling, and was deemed ‘proficient’ as of 26 August. In the meantime, Martin had been commissioned into the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve on 10 August 1944 as a Pilot Officer (No.182765). He and his crew then moved on to join No.5 Lancaster Flying School at Syerston from 3 September 1944 as a part of ‘B’ Flight, and they were then posted operational to join No.619 Squadron at Dunholme Lodge in Lincolnshire, and flying as a part of ‘A’ Flight in Lancaster bombers with No.5 Group of Bomber Command from 23 September 1944.
Flying as the second pilot to a Flying Officer Mather, Martin and his crew completed their first operational sortie on the night of 26 September 1944, when they flew in a raid to Munster, and after this Martin moved on to be first pilot. The second raid he flew was to Karlsruhe on the night of 26 September, and then on the following night he flew in a raid to Kaiserlauten. With the onset of October, his squadron moved to Strubby in east Lincolnshire, and on the night of 5 October he flew in a raid to Wilhelmshaven, following this with a raid to Bremen on 6 October. On 10 October he flew in a sortie to Veere, and on 14 October flew in a raid to Brunswick, during which his port outer engine went unserviceable. On 19 October he flew in the raid on Nuremberg, and on 23 October flew in a raid to Flushing. This, his eighth operational sortie, would be his last with 619 Squadron, and he and his crew then found themselves posted to No.189 Squadron at Fulbeck in Lincolnshire from 4 November 1944. Once afghan they flew in Lancaster bombers, this time as a part of ‘B’ Flight. This squadron was still a part of No.5 Group.
Martin’s first mission with 189 Squadron was a raid to Duren on 16 November, this being followed by a raid to Trondheim on 22 November, and one to Munich on 26 November. He flew in his first daylight raid, a sortie to Heinbach on 8 December, when his aircraft landed at Tangmere on its return. This was followed by the daylight raid to Heinbach on 11 December. On 18 December he flew a night mission to Gydinia, and then flew a night raid to Politz on 21 December, being diverted to Skitten on his return owing to issues with his aircraft. This, his 15 operational sortie, was his last for 1944.
On 1 January 1945 he flew in a night raid to Gravenhorst, landing at Milltown on his return. Then on 4 January he flew in a night sortie to Royan, this being followed by another raid on Politz on the night of 14 January, during which his crew is credited with having shot down a ‘confirmed’ ME.109 fighter in flames.
On the night of 1 February he flew in a sortie to Siegen, and the rest of the month was also spent on night sorties. On 7 February he flew in a sortie to Ladbergen, and on the following night, 8 February, in a sortie to Politz again, this being followed on 13 February by a sortie on Dresden. Martin was promoted to Flying Officer on 10 February 1945.
Early in 1945, the German offensive known as the Battle of the Bulge had been exhausted, as was the Luftwaffe’s failed New Year’s Day attack. The Red Army had launched its Silesian Offensives into pre-war German territory. The German army was retreating on all fronts, but still resisting. On 8 February 1945, the Red Army crossed the Oder River, with positions just 70km from Berlin. A special British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee report, German Strategy and Capacity to Resist, prepared for Winston Churchill’s eyes only, predicted that Germany might collapse as early as mid-April if the Soviets overran its eastern defences. Alternatively, the report warned that the Germans might hold out until November if they could prevent the Soviets from taking Silesia. Despite the post-war assessment, there were serious doubts in Allied intelligence as to how well the war was going for them, with fears of a "Nazi redoubt” being established, or of the Russian advance faltering. Hence, any assistance to the Soviets on the Eastern Front could shorten the war.
A large scale aerial attack on Berlin and other eastern cities was examined under the code name Operation Thunderclap in mid-1944, but was shelved on 16 August. This was later reexamined, and the decision made to pursue a more limited operation. The Soviet Army continued its push towards the Reich despite severe losses, which they sought to minimise in the final phase of the war. On 5 January 1945, two North American B-25 Mitchell bombers dropped 300,000 leaflets over Dresden with the "Appeal of 50 German generals to the German army and people".
On 22 January 1945, the RAF director of bomber operations suggested that if Thunderclap was timed so that it appeared to be a coordinated air attack to aid the current Soviet offensive, then the effect of the bombing on German morale would be increased. On 25 January, the Joint Intelligence Committee supported the idea, as Ultra-based intelligence had indicated that dozens of German divisions deployed in the west were moving to reinforce the Eastern Front, and that interdiction of these troop movements should be a "high priority". Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, as an ardent supporter of area bombing, when asked for his view, proposed a simultaneous attack on Chemnitz, Leipzig, and Dresden. That evening Churchill asked the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, what plans had been drawn up to carry out these proposals. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, answered: "We should use available effort in one big attack on Berlin and attacks on Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz, or any other cities where a severe blitz will not only cause confusion in the evacuation from the East, but will also hamper the movement of troops from the West." He mentioned that aircraft diverted to such raids should not be taken away from the current primary tasks of destroying oil production facilities, jet aircraft factories, and submarine yards.
Churchill was not satisfied with this answer and on 26 January pressed Sinclair for a plan of operations: "I asked [last night] whether Berlin, and no doubt other large cities in east Germany, should not now be considered especially attractive targets ... Pray, report to me tomorrow what is going to be done”. In response to Churchill's inquiry, Sinclair approached Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, who asked Harris to undertake attacks on Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig, and Chemnitz as soon as moonlight and weather permitted, "with the particular object of exploiting the confused conditions which are likely to exist in the above-mentioned cities during the successful Russian advance". This allowed Sinclair to inform Churchill on 27 January of the Air Staff's agreement that, "subject to the overriding claims" on other targets under the Pointblank Directive, strikes against communications in these cities to disrupt civilian evacuation from the east and troop movement from the west would be made.
On 31 January, Bottomley sent Portal a message saying a heavy attack on Dresden and other cities "will cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from the east and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts". British historian Frederick Taylor mentions a further memo sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee by Air Marshal Sir Douglas Evill on 1 February, in which Evill states interfering with mass civilian movements was a key factor in the decision to bomb the city centre. Attacking main railway junctions, telephone systems, city administration and utilities would result in "chaos". Britain had ostensibly learned this after the Coventy Blitz, when loss of this crucial infrastructure had supposedly longer-lasting effects than attacks on war plants.
During the Yalta Conference on 4 February, the Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff raised the issue of hampering the reinforcement of German troops from the western front by paralysing the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig with aerial bombardment. In response, Portal, who was in Yalta, asked Bottomley to send him a list of objectives to discuss with the Soviets. Bottomley's list included oil plants, tank and aircraft factories and the cities of Berlin and Dresden. However, according to Richard Overy, the discussion with the Soviet Chief of Staff, Aleksei Antonov, recorded in the minutes, only mentions the bombing of Berlin and Leipzig. The bombing of Dresden was a Western plan, but the Soviets were told in advance about the operation.
According to the RAF at the time, Dresden was Germany's seventh-largest city and the largest remaining un-bombed, built-up area. An RAF memo issued to airmen on the night of the attack gave some reasoning for the raid: ‘Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester is also the largest un-bombed built-up area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westward and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees, and troops alike, but to house the administrative services displaced from other areas. At one time well known for its china, Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance ... The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance, and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do.
On 13 February 1945, bad weather over Europe prevented any USAAF operations, and it was left to Bomber Command to carry out the first raid. It had been decided that the raid would be a double strike, in which a second wave of bombers would attack three hours after the first, just as the rescue teams were trying to put out the fires.
The first of the British aircraft took off at around 17:20 hours for the 700-mile journey. This was a group of Lancasters from Bomber Command's 83 Squadron in No.5 Group, acting as the Pathfinders, or flare force, whose job it was to find Dresden and drop magnesium parachute flares, known to the Germans as "Christmas trees", to mark and light up Dresden for the aircraft that would mark the target itself. The next set of aircraft to leave England were twin-engined Mosquito marker planes, which would identify target areas and drop 1,000-pound (450kg) target indicators (TIs) that marked the target for the bombers to aim at. The attack was to centre on the Ostragehege sports stadium, next to the city's medieval Altstadt (old town), with its congested and highly combustible timbered buildings.
The main bomber force, called Plate Rack, took off shortly after the Pathfinders. This group of 254 Lancasters carried 500 tons of high explosives and 375 tons of incendiaries ("fire bombs"). There were 200,000 incendiaries in all, with the high-explosive bombs ranging in weight from 500 to 4,000lb (230 to 1,810kg) —the two-ton “cookies”, also known as "blockbusters", because they could destroy an entire large building or street. The high explosives were intended to rupture water mains and blow off roofs, doors, and windows to expose the interiors of the buildings and create an air flow to feed the fires caused by the incendiaries that followed.
The Lancasters crossed into France near the Somme, then into Germany just north of Cologne. At 22:00 hours, the force heading for Böhlen split away from Plate Rack, which turned south-east toward the Elbe. By this time, ten of the Lancasters were out of service, leaving 244 to continue to Dresden. The sirens started sounding in Dresden at 21:51 (CET). The 'Master Bomber' Wing Commander Maurice Smith, flying in a Mosquito, gave the order to the Lancasters: "Controller to Plate Rack Force: Come in and bomb glow of red target indicators as planned. Bomb the glow of red TIs as planned".
The first bombs were released at 22:13, the last at 22:28, the Lancasters delivering 881.1 tons of bombs, 57% high explosive, 43% incendiaries. The fan-shaped area that was bombed was 1.25mile long, and at its extreme about 1.75miles wide. The shape and total devastation of the area was created by the bombers of No. 5 Group flying over the head of the fan (Ostragehege stadium) on prearranged compass bearings and releasing their bombs at different prearranged times. The second attack, three hours later, was by Lancaster aircraft of 1, 3, 6 and 8 Groups. 8 Group being the Pathfinders. By now, the thousands of fires from the burning city could be seen more than 60miles away on the ground– the second wave had been able to see the initial fires from a distance of over 90miles. The Pathfinders therefore decided to expand the target, dropping flares on either side of the firestorm, including the Hauptbahnhof, the main train station, and the Großer Garten, a large park, both of which had escaped damage during the first raid. The German sirens sounded again at 01:05, but these were small hand-held sirens that were heard within only a block. Between 01:21 and 01:45, 529 Lancasters dropped more than 1,800 tons of bombs.
Two furthers raids followed on Dresden, one in daylight on 14 February, and one by Bomber Command on the night of 14-15 February, but Martin, who had flown in th first wave for the attack on the night of 13 February, did not participate in these other raids.
According to the official German report Tagesbefehl (Order of the Day) no.47 ("TB47") issued on 22 March, the number of dead recovered by that date was 20,204, including 6,865 who were cremated on the Altmarkt square, and they expected the total number of deaths to be about 25,000. Another report on 3 April put the number of corpses recovered at 22,096. Three municipal and 17 rural cemeteries outside Dresden recorded up to 30 April 1945 a total of at least 21,895 buried bodies from the Dresden raids, including those cremated on the Altmarkt.
Between 100,000 and 200,000 refugees fleeing westward from advancing Soviet forces were in the city at the time of the bombing. Exact figures are unknown, but reliable estimates were calculated based on train arrivals, foot traffic, and the extent to which emergency accommodation had to be organised. The city authorities did not distinguish between residents and refugees when establishing casualty numbers and "took great pains to count all the dead, identified and unidentified". This was largely achievable because most of the dead succumbed to suffocation; in only four places were recovered remains so badly burned that it was impossible to ascertain the number of victims. The uncertainty this introduced is thought to amount to no more than 100 people. 35,000 people were registered with the authorities as missing after the raids, around 10,000 were later found alive. A further 1,858 bodies were discovered during the reconstruction of Dresden between the end of the war and 1966. In all, somewhere between 22,700 and 25,000 were killed.
Martin flew a sortie to Rositz on 14 February, and then one to Bohlen on 19 February, before flying in a sortie to Gravenhorst on 20 February, being diverted to Colerne in Wiltshire on his return. Finally for the month, he flew a sortie to Horten on 23 February.
On 6 March he flew a sortie to Sassnitz, and the on 7 March flew to Harburg to the north of Hamburg. On 20 March he flew in a sortie to Bohlen, and on 21 March in a raid on Hamburg. Finally for that month, he flew his 32nd operational sortie, a raid on Wesel on 23 March. Martin’s final sortie of the war, was a daylight raid, this being to Nordhausen on 4 April 1945, his 33rd operational sortie. As of 29 April 1945 he was rated as an ‘above the average’ heavy bomber pilot.
Having completed some 33 operational sorties. His award of the Distinguished Flying Cross was published in the London Gazette for 16 November 1945, and news of his award was published in a local Liverpool newspaper, which gives his citation. ‘Flying Officer Martin has completed a tour of operational duty. By his fine fighting spirit, determination and cheerful devotion to duty, he has set an inspiring example to all. On once occasion, when taking part in an attack on Bohlen, one of the engines of his aircraft failed when some 100 miles from the target. Despite the fact that he could not attain bombing height and had the greatest difficulty in keeping to times, this officer went on to the target and pressed home the attack with courage and resolution. His dogged determination, skill and fine fighting spirit have been an inspiration to the other members of his squadron. A daring and resourceful pilot, this officer has always displayed great gallantry and devotion to duty.’
In May 1945 Martin began flying with No.1660 Heavy Bomber Conversion Unit at Swinderby, training others on the Lancaster bomber as part of ‘A’ Flight. Then from early June 1945 he was with No.3 Flying Instructor’s School at Lulsgate Bottom, training on the Oxford, before passing the Flying Instructor’s qualification course on 3 July 1945. He then rejoined No.1660 H.C.B.U. at Swinderby some three days later. In early August 1945 he switched to the Bomber Command Instructor's School at Finningley, once again flying the Lancaster when a part of ‘D’ Flight. He was rated as an ‘average’ instructor on 14 September 1945. From mid-September he was back with 1660 H.B.C.U as part of ‘A’ Flight, and was last flying with this unit on 16 November 1945.
Martin was back flying when he flew in Tiger Moth, Auster and Gemini aircraft with the Air Service Training School at Hamble during December 1947 to May 1948, though he only managed five flights in this period. No further entries are given in his log book. Apparently he participated in some capacity in the Berlin Airlift between June 1948 and May 1949, quite possibly flying in Dakota’s in a civil capacity, as he is known to have gone on to fly as a pilot with British European Airways.
